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For men, behavior such as delving into and narrating one’s life 
experiences is at once considered tantamount to the work of a novelist. 
I, however, have been told that it is important for me to write about 
being ‘a woman’ while listening to others’ experiences of being 
‘women’—probably because it is thought that the problems faced by 
being ‘a woman’ become clearer when ‘women’ delve into them 
together. Although male novelists who write about the experience of 
the self are not at all interesting, at least their perspective in writing is 
not narrowed to probing into what it means to be ‘a man.’ Why is it that 
only women must continue to write about being ‘a woman’?  
 
—Kanai Mieko, “Onna ni totte onna to wa nani ka?”  
(What are women to a woman?), 1972. 
 
Kanai Mieko’s interrogation of gender categories has been the subject of 
repeated academic inquiries in both English and Japanese since the early 
1990s.1 Her early short stories, “Funiku” (Rotting meat, 1972) and “Usagi” 
(Rabbits, 1972), both of which have been translated into English, have 
generated the majority of such queries. These have sought to show, in 
varying ways, how Kanai Mieko, from the very outset of her writing 
career, problematized the written formation of female subjectivities 
through her short fiction and poetry. Indeed, by immersing herself in 
avant-garde writing and art (the preserve of leading male writers, artists, 
and intellectuals in the Japan of the time) Kanai drew upon surrealist 
techniques, tropes, and theories to write poetry and fiction which 
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dismantled such gender formulations.2 However, while her critique of 
conventional literary inscriptions of woman/gender has hitherto drawn 
focus in literary criticism on Kanai, in this article I instead focus on her 
simultaneous critique—evident in the epigraph above—of conventional 
literary inscriptions of man/self.3 In particular, I seek to show, via Tomi 
Suzuki’s formative theory on the I-novel, how her debut novella, Ai no 
seikatsu (Love life, 1967) can be read as both invoking and subverting 
what had previously been seen as an intrinsically masculine genre. 
 
Writing against the I-Novel 
Let us begin by situating Kanai’s debut novella alongside Virginia 
Woolf’s 1919 essay, “Modern Fiction,” in which Woolf critiques 
dominant masculine modes of writing and proposes a means of conceiving 
and writing a quotidian reality which challenges naturalism’s claim to 
representational accuracy. Woolf writes: 
 
The writer [of naturalist fiction] seems constrained, not by his own free 
will but by some powerful and unscrupulous tyrant who has him in 
thrall, to provide a plot, to provide comedy, tragedy, love interest, and 
an air of probability embalming the whole […]. But [… i]s life like 
this? Must novels be like this? 
 
Look within and life, it seems, is very far from being ‘like this’. 
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind 
receives a myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or 
engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an 
incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape 
themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls 
differently from of old […]. Life is not a series of gig lamps 
symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the 
end. Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this 
unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or 
complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and 
external as possible?4 
 
Of course, the naturalism against which Woolf was writing, and the 
twentieth-century watakushi shōstestu or shishōstestu (I-novel) against 
which (it is my contention) Kanai is writing, cannot be straightforwardly 
homogenized; nor does this essay attempt to do so. However, both can be 
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understood as attempts by an overwhelmingly masculine literary status 
quo to lay claim to and govern the terms of represented “reality.” 
Writers of naturalist fiction in Japan, such as Tayama Katai (1872–
1930) and Shimazaki Tōson (1872–1943), directed the “scientific” and 
“objective” gaze of the naturalist writer primarily towards that which was 
personal, in producing an analysis, not of society, or of life in general—
which they felt they did not have the authority to comment upon—but of 
the “self.” A number of “self-conscious I-novelists” writing in the Taishō 
period (1912–1926) in Japan subsequently adopted this meticulous 
approach to the self in writing very candidly about their daily life as 
impoverished writers.5 Thus, with its often rambling, plotless, quasi-
autobiographical searching for and inscription of a “self,” the I-novel 
seems paradoxically to marry Woolf’s critique of western naturalism’s 
“tyrant,” with the “scientific” and “objective” gaze of the naturalist writer 
himself. As Fowler writes: 
 
Rather than attempt to create a fictional world that transcended his 
immediate circumstances, [the I-novelist] sought to transcribe the world 
as he had experienced it, with little concern for overall narrative design. 
Unschooled in the notion of telos, he regarded plot as an unnatural 
fabrication. He therefore limited the scope of his authority to his 
personal realm, the depiction of which was dictated by lived 
experience, and his chief enterprise consisted of recording his own 
thoughts and actions.6 
 
Indeed, in terms of their textual materiality, these early I-novel 
experiments appear closer in kind to the impressionistic writing about 
subjective experience which Woolf’s essay advocates, than they are to 
their putative naturalist origins. Therefore, we can only begin to 
understand how this seemingly (and ostentatiously) humble genre can be 
read as an attempt to govern the terms of “reality” in modern Japanese 
literature through a consideration of how the genre came to evolve, as 
Tomi Suzuki puts forward, as a powerful and pervasive “meta-narrative.”7 
The self-conscious I-novelists writing in the Taishō period were 
writing at a time when “the ideal of the individual self as an independent 
social and moral entity was widely considered a fundamental premise of 
life, literature, and art;” they thus thought that the novel was a “transparent 
medium” through which they could “faithfully reveal [their] ‘genuine 
self’.”8 Their chronicles of daily life focused on describing and exposing 
the sexual and romantic feelings of the writer, while actively seeking and 
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inscribing—hence ascribing—ever greater levels of complexity to the 
notion of (the written) “self.” Although the limitations of writing (and 
living) in this way quickly became apparent to the writers themselves, the 
I-novel as a genre nevertheless thrived as “an interpretive tradition or 
reading paradigm” from the 1920s to the 1960s.9 As Suzuki notes: 
 
The term [I-novel] circulated as a powerful and uncanny signifier 
without a fixed, identifiable signified, generating a critical discourse 
that informed not only the nature of literature but also views of 
Japanese selfhood, society and tradition. […] The characteristics of the 
so-called I-novel texts were largely defined by and within this I-novel 
meta-narrative and then projected back on certain texts.10 
 
An I-novel is not, therefore, simply a genre of writing in which the 
experiences of the masculine self are “delved into and narrated;” it is more 
crucially an implied mode of reading which assumes that the 
narrator/protagonist will be inferred by the reader to be an unmediated 
(re)presentation of the writer himself. In such readings, as Suzuki posits, 
the authenticity and immediacy of the uniquely “Japanese” mode of 
writing is placed in binary contrast with the western novel, and held up as 
being representative of Japanese society, history, and culture. Thus, up 
until and including the time of Kanai’s debut with Love Life, the male 
author’s life was, broadly speaking, considered as “the definitive ‘text’” 
through which not only literary meaning, but social and historical reality 
was established.11 That such a means of establishing and circulating 
meaning privileged the experiences of men while excluding those of 
women was thus no accident.  
Love Life operates in several ways to disrupt and confound such 
literary critical discourse. First and foremost, its title (Ai no seikatsu), 
appears at once to invite the novella to be read as an I-novel, while 
forewarning of its challenge to such an established literary medium 
through the simple, but effective, means of the pun with the kanji for 
“love” (ai).12 Although “Ai” is a relatively common female given-name in 
Japanese, precisely because of the expectations that a novel might 
constitute a search for the self, it could here be read as playing, not only 
on the English first person “I,” but also its homophone, the “eye.” Coupled 
with the word “seikatsu” (quotidian life) the title—which literally 
rendered could be translated as The Life of Ai—unmistakably refers to the 
I-novel genre, while simultaneously informing us that its protagonist is an 
active viewing female subject, whose name evokes the concept of love. 
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That “Ai” is used to refer to the protagonist/narrator solely in the title and 
never again within the pages of the novella might further confirm that the 
title’s function is to evoke and play on the I-novel genre—including those 
early I-novelist writers’ explorations of their sexual desires, or “love life.”  
Secondly, the novella adopts a narrative form, a kind of stream-of-
consciousness, recalling Woolf’s “myriad impressions” of a non-linear 
lived experience, being subjective, chaotic, fragmentary, and of the 
moment.13 In so doing, it can be seen to challenge the I-novel’s “objective” 
voice which provides a retrospective, rationalized, and diachronic account 
of the self and its day-to-day experiences: 
 
From the canteen window the rail tracks in the station yard can be seen, 
and the painter comments that, viewed from a height, the tracks have 
the vivid reality of another dimension to them, as if a child has drawn 
the tracks in black and white with slate pencils. I listened to the 
painter’s words while enduring a pain, like a tension, that crept up the 
right side of my back. Suddenly the pain came upon me. 
The pain is suddenly upon me. As I finish reading the letter, the right 
side of my back is throbbing. I close my eyes for a minute, while 
listening to the melody of the tango that the coffee shop is playing (the 
Tango of Roses) and hold my breath. […] 
It’s so painful. I wake alone in the middle of the night and hold my 
pen; I’m so scared sometimes that I even wake up F. I hate it. I hate it. 
I’m afraid. My life, every day, the room, the desk, everything, is 
completely unrelated to me. There’s nothing to be done, that’s how it 
is. I feel like I’m going mad. I feel sick. 
I turned to the painter and spoke impulsively. 
I tried to fight the words, washed clean by my sincerity, as they came 
out of my mouth.14 
 
In this extract, as is the case for much of the novella, Ai’s stream-of-
consciousness travels back and forth between past memories, anxieties for 
the future, and her own present physical and sensory experiences, all of 
which are linked associatively. In the first paragraph above, Ai recalls 
visiting a canteen in a department store in Ikebukuro with an unnamed 
character, referred to only as “the painter,” after they have both just said 
goodbye at Tokyo station to a mutual friend moving to Kyoto. The 
painter’s comment that the rail tracks have the “vivid reality of another 
dimension” coincides with a painful sensation that creeps up Ai’s back. In 
the second paragraph this pain then intrudes into the “present moment”—
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or rather—the most chronologically recent moment that has been 
described within the stream of consciousness at this point in the novella. 
In this “present moment,” Ai is seated at a café having just read a letter 
from the friend who (has now already) moved to Kyoto. The pain 
experienced in the present moment in turn evokes the “pain” of waking up 
alone in the middle of the night in her room as described in the third 
paragraph. Through re-experiencing this pain, Ai then recalls her 
impulsive speech-act to the painter at another, different point in the past, 
when she is visiting him in his atelier (which has already been set up and 
partially explained in the course of her narration). Finally, in the last 
paragraph, she reflects upon her emotions at the time of that speech act—
although we are never told what she said to the painter. Through such 
associative writing, which switches back and forth between the present 
and multiple past memories, the narrative creates a multiplicity of Ais 
(eyes), all of whom seem preoccupied with a particular aspect of their 
respective “selves,” whether physiological, existential, experiential, or 
emotional. This thereby problematizes any illusory unity of voice (and, 
hence, of identity) that might otherwise be implied by the mere fact of the 
text’s having a first-person narrator. In other words, the implied promise 
made by I-novel discourse that a first-person narrative is necessarily 
guaranteed to reveal a whole, unified, authorial “identity,” is fatally 
compromised. 
Developing this point, we can see how Love Life challenges a 
correlated premise of the I-novel genre: namely that, through the medium 
of the novel, it is possible to record such a thing as an “individual self” 
that stands independently from the culture in which it is enmeshed. 
Instead, Love Life manages to inscribe a kaleidoscope of contemporary 
late-1960s Japanese culture, both popular and avant-garde, within the 
stream-of-consciousness narrative of its protagonist. Ai’s narrative does 
not rely on an objective voice to constitute the terms of her identity against 
all that might conventionally be understood as “external” to her. Instead, 
it elides her “internal monologue” of recollections, observations, and 
physical descriptions with the transcription of multiple texts and “real 
world” cultural phenomena at the moment that she encounters them. For 
instance, the text incorporates the lyrics to a Miyako Harumi song that Ai 
overhears in the shopping arcade at the point in the narrative when it is 
played; so too does it amalgamate the text of both the postcard invitation 
she receives to a John Cage concert, and her friend’s letter from Kyoto, at 
the moment when Ai reads them. By dissolving any boundary between 
Ai’s thoughts, “real world” contemporary culture, and the texts that Ai 
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reads, the novella thus gestures towards the notion that identity itself is an 
assemblage of texts.  
 
Love Life’s Reception by the Dazai Osamu Literary Prize 
Committee 
The extent of the challenge posed by the novella to the literary 
establishment of the day can be clearly understood when one reads the 
comments it received when it was runner-up in the competition for the 
1967 Dazai Osamu Literary Prize. The panel for the prize comprised of 
six men, all but one of whom were in their sixties: four (Karaki Junzō, 
Kawakami Tetsutarō, Usui Yoshimi and Nakamura Mitsuo) had graduated 
from either Tokyo or Kyoto University and subsequently pursued careers 
as literary critics, writers, translators, or university professors; while the 
other two (Ibuse Masuji and Ishikawa Jun) were famous writers. In other 
words, the judging panel were (unsurprisingly) wholly emblematic of the 
Japanese literary establishment. The first thing of note in their comments 
on Love Life is a discernible attempt to account for the novella, through 
their inventing a biographical explanation for its narrative procedures. In 
other words, they establish the meaning and worth of Kanai’s debut 
novella through a reading of Kanai herself. The evaluative criteria brought 
to bear upon Kanai and her achievements, moreover, are generated 
through an implied comparison to the ideal I-novel protagonist: the 
mature, university educated, male author. Such a figure—a figure which 
much resembles the judges themselves, one might add—is repeatedly 
evoked (and implicitly invoked) as a means to critique, pejoratively, 
Kanai’s writing. For instance, Karaki writes: 
 
The talent of the work just trickles out with no control. If the writer had 
… placed a brake on her talent, allowing it to pool and stagnate, it 
would gain weight. But I suppose this is an impossible request for a 
nineteen-year-old.15 
 
Kanai’s youth, then, is for Karaki, the supreme determining factor for the 
novella’s narrative technique (or implied lack thereof). Similarly, 
Kawakami comments upon both Kanai’s age and gender which he 
perceives as being directly relevant to the literary worth of Love Life. The 
novella, he opines, 
 
… strikes one with the distinctiveness of a writer who is a nineteen-
year-old woman, half living the lifestyle of a student; in short the 
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weakness of the work is that the freshness that we should highly regard 
of the discoveries of this adolescent woman who stands for the first 
time at the gate of life is, at the same time, a handicap.16 
 
As for Kawakami, so too for Usui. He also remarks upon Kanai’s age, 
commenting that she perforce lacks the education required to be a writer: 
 
[F]or a work of a nineteen-year-old adolescent, it is, relatively 
speaking, markedly developed, and even interesting. However, I 
assume this is because the writer has read interesting bits and pieces of 
foreign literature in translation, and this has given birth to some 
sensitive responses and reflections. If you wish to become a writer, 
first, pass the entrance exam of the university of your dreams. Then try 
writing a novel in five or ten years’ time.17 
 
And so it goes. Nakamura then takes his criticisms one step further than 
Usui and Kawakami. Instead of choosing to account for both Kanai’s age 
and gender as mere aspects of her biography (the novelist’s necessarily 
having to be judged in terms of a life-story), Nakamura moves closer to 
naturalizing his colleagues’ judgments, by accounting for Love Life 
physiologically: 
 
Miss Kanai Mieko’s Love Life is a work of a nineteen-year-old 
adolescent woman but, although it shows literary talent, I cannot think 
that it is any more than a simple piece of composition. After stuffing 
her head full of literary images, she relied on her wit and just attempted 
to write something akin to a novel; its moments of narcissistic 
innocence arise from her lack of life experience and are physiological 
in basis, in the same way as you might say that her cheeks are rosy and 
her skin is pretty.18 
 
Even if we ignore for a moment the fact that, rather than the text, Kanai 
herself is the object of critique in the first four judges’ comments, it is 
nonetheless apparent that the elements of the text that elicit their critical 
disapproval are precisely those discussed above: those textual procedures 
and features which challenge and problematize conventional I-novel 
discourse.19 This in turn allows us to reclaim the judges’ critiques, by 
inverting their pejoration, and revealing the literary-critical prejudices that 
underpin their pronouncements. For instance, Nakamura’s comment that 
Love Life is “something akin to a novel” (shōsetsu rashī mono), although 
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meant to be pejorative, seems nonetheless to allude to the numerous ways 
in which, as we have seen, the novella imitates (in order to play with) the 
I-novel genre through its title and the narrator’s chronicling of mundane 
events. Similarly, in writing that Kanai’s “talent […] trickles out with no 
control,” Karaki is presumably referring to Kanai’s decision to replace any 
“coherent” internal voice with a stream-of-consciousness narrative. The 
multitude of contemporary references to popular culture, counter-culture 
and surrealism that are embedded in Ai’s narrative, not to mention her 
half-student-like lifestyle to which Kawakami takes exception, is surely 
the basis for Nakamura’s lament that Kanai-the-author’s own “head” is 
“stuffed” with “literary [and artistic] images.” By inscribing a 
contemporary selfhood which is necessarily inextricable from a 
surrounding popular culture that is no longer of solely Japanese origin, 
Ai’s stream-of-consciousness narrative thus defies conventional modern 
Japanese conceptions of the duality between “Japanese” and the “foreign 
literatures” to which Usui refers. Taking all those textual elements 
together, we can see how they might prove unsettling for Kanai’s critics 
on the panel, critics who wish to continue to define the modern Japanese 
writing subject in, effectively, their own image: whole, cohesive, 
rationalized, mature, Japanese and male, and the very antithesis of Kanai’s 
narrator. That four mature, university educated, established male authors 
and critics all felt the need to argue that Kanai had written something 
which they perceived she lacked the authority to write demonstrates not 
only that Kanai’s novella was indeed considered a threat to such authority, 
but moreover, the manner in which I-novel discourse conveniently served 
to police those who wished to hold up different versions of literary reality.  
 
Ai-body-presence 
Let us now turn to the remaining two critics on the prize panel, Ibuse and 
Ishikawa, who, as already noted above, differed from their colleagues 
through their being (predominantly) creative practitioners rather than 
(again predominantly) literary critics. Neither invents biographical 
explanations for the novella’s narrative procedures and each, moreover, is 
alive to the interpretive demands Love Life makes of its readers. The more 
positive response is from Ibuse, who writes: 
 
When I read the beginning [of Love Life], I had the feeling that it 
wasn’t going to work. It was like the bewilderment I felt in standing in 
front of a modernist painting. I remember my heart racing. It was a 
feeling akin to that. However, little by little, as I continued to read on, it 
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started to make sense …. I came to the meeting with the intention that 
if the selection committee had gone cold on Visions in Azure, I would 
cast my vote for Love Life.20 
 
Ibuse’s recognition of the novella’s narrative form as reminiscent of 
modernism, his acceptance of uncertainty and “bewilderment” as 
potentially positive responses to art, and his assertion that the novella 
“started to make sense” as he read on, sets him apart from all the other 
critics, suggesting that Ibuse’s own sense of artistic worth was not held 
hostage by the kind of insecurities that, one might argue, bubble to the 
surface in the responses of the previous four judges. However, that Love 
Life was runner-up in the prize was largely due to the grudging influence 
of Ishikawa, even as he bemoaned the low standard of the entries. The 
world of literature, he laments, is hardly flourishing; “rather, it is close to 
decline” (dochira ka to ieba, bunkosuitai ni chikai).21 Accordingly, even 
though Love Life is his first choice, he nevertheless remains troubled by 
what he terms a “fuzziness”: 
 
Even though a flash of talent can be seen in Love Life, the world of this 
novel dies before it has taken solid shape. We leave reality, but before 
even gaining entrance into the world of fiction, everything becomes 
fuzzy. To borrow from the words used in the text itself, it does not 
result in dépaysement. Worst of all, the writer’s feelings rise up and are 
exposed. In a novel, feelings are completely useless. […] It is vulgar 
for powerful elements to rise prominently to the fore, but the fuzziness 
at its core is troubling.22 
 
Ishikawa’s chief concern is the text’s perceived inability to achieve a 
heightened representationalist aesthetic—or as he writes, to “result in 
dépaysement” (a sense of otherness from our familiar reality). Equally 
noteworthy, however, is his rebuke that “the writer’s feelings rise up and 
are exposed” which is significant, particularly when one sets it against his 
other observation that “[w]e leave reality but before even gaining entrance 
into the world of fiction, everything becomes fuzzy.” Taken together, these 
three comments suggest that for Ishikawa, in certain places, the novella 
works as a representation of Kanai’s emotional and psychological reality 
(something which he finds problematic), while nonetheless being a self-
evident piece of fiction which leads him to perceive a blurring—or 
“fuzziness”—of genre.  
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So, what are the features of the text that might have led Ishikawa to 
this “troubled” conclusion? One answer might lie in the way in which Ai’s 
narrative works to repeatedly foreground the body and its repressed 
material reality, thereby inscribing the self through a matrix of 
associations—and we saw this associative technique at work in the extract 
quoted above—which I shall term Ai-body-presence. One might then note 
that the repressed material reality that this literary matrix describes greatly 
resembles Julia Kristeva’s idea of the “abject.” In setting out her theory of 
the “abject,” Kristeva famously challenges Freud and Lacan’s positioning 
of a finite dualism at the origin of the self by positing the maternal body 
as a pre-cultural zone that precedes and produces the ego.23 She then 
argues that in order to conceive the self as an “ideal,” “whole,” “separate,” 
“clean,” and crucially “human” entity, the mother’s body, along with 
excrement, filth—and, more broadly, the world of animals or animalism—
are radically and violently repressed, or “abjected,” from the infant’s 
identity.24 However, precisely because, Kristeva argues, repression is 
enacted through our use of language, the abject, or the reality it represents, 
is not permanently banished, but continues to assault us unexpectedly, 
confronting us with its horrific material reality. Such encounters thus are 
“articulated” through the fragmentation of language, or rather a 
breakdown in the subject’s ability to describe reality. Accounting for Love 
Life in these terms thus helps us to see Ishikawa’s twin expressions of what 
he finds “troubling” (“the writer’s feelings rise up and are exposed,” “it is 
vulgar for powerful elements to rise prominently to the fore”) as steps on 
the road to understanding Ai’s fragmented narrative as a textual enactment 
of the abject, of the return of the repressed and of the consequent fractured 
“self.” 
For Kristeva “[f]ood loathing” is “perhaps the most elementary and 
most archaic form of abjection” and is central—if such a fragmented 
associative narrative can have a center—to Love Life.25 The first task Ai 
undertakes for the day, as the novella commences, is to attempt to 
remember what she has eaten over the previous week and on which day, 
and it is through this task that the narrator’s aims in writing her diary 
emerge. As Ai writes: 
 
A new day has started. 
Although, where yesterday finished I already can’t clearly remember. 
I can’t even properly recall what kind of day it was yesterday. I look at 
the clock next to my pillow and it’s ten o’clock. What was it that I had 
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for dinner last night? For dinner last night I had deep-fried oysters, 
apple and lettuce salad, and miso soup with tofu. 
The day before yesterday was pork chops, potato salad, and miso 
soup with spring onion and deep-fried tofu. Lunch yesterday was a 
croissant with a glass of milk, and the day before it was the same. 
Anyway, when I woke up at ten o’clock yesterday, I finally succeeded 
in remembering what was for dinner and lunch in detail, stretching 
back a week. 
But today I can only recall it fragmentarily.26 
 
Ai’s inability to remember things, and in particular, to recall what she has 
eaten over the past week, are thus a source of anxiety. She writes that 
yesterday she called up her husband F to resolve the matter, making a note 
of meals eaten. Today, she looks at the note to prompt her memory, but 
realizing that the note and her memory contradict each other, and 
reasoning with herself that the note is based on yesterday’s memory, she 
concludes that she has no way of knowing which is correct, her memory 
or the note. In other words, neither “consciousness” nor “text” are able to 
access or accurately represent a certain material reality, just as Kristeva’s 
abject is a pre-linguistic state which cannot be described through, and 
causes the fragmentation of, language.  
Ai’s troubled preoccupation with food here foreshadows later, 
traumatic encounters with the act of eating, the memory of which she 
continually suppresses: 
 
I am always in terror of my incessant hunger. I always have an empty 
stomach, and cannot stop thinking I want to eat. And yet, when I eat 
even one or two mouthfuls of food, my empty stomach makes me so 
anxious that my hunger vanishes without trace. Just looking at food, 
my throat heaves with nausea.27 
 
In the original passage, Ai writes “taemanai kūfukukan ga, itsumo watashi 
o obiyakashite imasu,” translated above as: “I am always in terror of my 
incessant hunger.” However, the term obiyakashite imasu, unlike the word 
terror, also connotes being taken suddenly unaware; therefore, its use here 
suggests that Ai’s hunger is a force that assaults her suddenly, regardless 
of her intent. In this sense, we can see how Ai’s hunger functions much 
like Kristeva’s “abject.” Hunger “draws” Ai to the physical act of eating 
which she subsequently cannot remember or record accurately, just as the 
abject “draws [one] toward the place where meaning collapses.”28 
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Moreover, in the middle of this act, after one or two mouthfuls, whereupon 
the boundaries between Ai and the abject entity (the food) are collapsed, 
her hunger turns quickly to fear and anxiety, in the same way that, for 
Kristeva, reunion with the mother’s body creates a sudden fear of being 
suffocated.  
The most protracted appearance of “abject” food imagery occurs when 
Ai visits a restaurant in downtown Tokyo. Ai sits down at a small table for 
two and quickly orders a small bottle of beer, Hungarian style beef stew, 
bread, and coffee. Having ordered, she lights a cigarette and overhears 
fragments of the conversations of her fellow diners. One of them calculates 
that the average person consumes 76,650 mealtimes in a lifetime. Another 
exclaims that this is “surprisingly few” (angai sukunē mon da na).29 Thus, 
we are introduced to the idea, even before Ai has begun eating, of food as 
a continuous mass (an average of 76,650 mealtimes per lifetime) 
constantly passing through us, as human waste, as excess, as that which 
we will irrevocably exclude and abject. The paradoxical counter-claim that 
the number of mealtimes is surprisingly few reminds us that, by contrast, 
each meal for Ai becomes excessive even after a few mouthfuls.  
As the abject continues to intrude into her narrative, we are presented 
with a chain of images that pertain both to her real-time situation and the 
vivid and traumatic memories that they provoke. These become 
progressively more grotesque in nature and lead both her, and a fellow 
diner (who has entered the restaurant, been seated opposite Ai, and ordered 
spaghetti bolognese), to “abject” their food. The fellow diner’s meal 
arrives. Ai watches him, defamiliarizing the eating process by 
commenting that it is as if he is “shoveling food into the hole in his face.” 
The spaghetti then prompts a memory of the small dark infirmary at her 
primary school with a box-frame on its wall bearing the inscription “many 
kinds of parasites.” Ai recalls: 
 
In the middle of the frame, six round shapes had been dug out, and in 
those holes “many kinds of parasites” were sleeping peacefully, tightly. 
Among them was one which I always ended up fixing upon; it was a 
long, thin, cream and white roundworm; this roundworm glistened 
amongst pink lumps, sleeping deeply. What was that pink stuff that 
resembled fried-off minced meat? One reason I particularly hate 
spaghetti bolognese could be that it makes me remember that 
roundworm.30 
 
 | Japanese Language and Literature 
Japanese Language and Literature | jll.pitt.edu 
Vol. 53 | Number 1 | April 2019 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.5195/jll.2019.46 
108
The man in front of Ai becomes uncomfortable as she stares at his dish. 
She asks him “You know roundworms?” He looks down at the plate as if 
remembering. “They look like that. Don’t they.” Without finishing the last 
few mouthfuls the man immediately stands up and exits the restaurant, 
leaving Ai to wonder if she is “terribly vulgar.”31 
By describing him as “shoveling food into the hole in his face,” Ai 
renders the fellow diner a mere performer of mechanical movements in 
front of a gaping orifice, as an “uncanny,” disembodied human presence, 
or cadaver.32 For Kristeva the uncanny aspect of the cadaver is due to the 
fact that it inhabits that liminal space of the abject, as something which 
was human but which has been expelled, and is now thus “the most 
sickening of wastes.”33 This elision between food as waste and the 
customer as waste, and Ai’s revulsion at them both suggests that for Ai the 
boundaries between self and other have (or are being perceived as having) 
collapsed, thereby immersing Ai in abject imagery. Ai perceives that it is 
no longer just that the process of living produces constant waste that she 
must continually discard and abject; rather, human life itself is excess 
materiality, or waste. In other words, she perceives that her own body is 
abject. Thus, the customer can be read as the defamiliarized image, or 
reflection, of Ai’s body eating and as a materialization of the inevitability 
of her own death.  
This recognition of her own immortality is reinforced during Ai’s 
recollection of her childhood memory and long held association between 
spaghetti bolognese and roundworms. The image of the cadaver—and the 
elision between herself and it—intensifies, returning repeatedly and 
menacingly in the form of the human anatomical models on display in the 
infirmary. Their brightly colored innards “make [her] wonder about the 
color of her own innards.”34 In other words, they prompt her to consider 
her body as objectively as she considers the cadaver’s. The lined-up 
medical paraphernalia, scissors, tweezers, and bandages, also compound 
this association between her body, lined up as an object of examination 
and surgical treatment, and damaged, infected, or dead “matter.”  
Ai finally escapes these images of her death by assuming the abject 
identity of the roundworm. The roundworm parasite, the focal image of 
the passage, traverses three states of being. Firstly, it is seemingly passive: 
“sleeping deeply among pink lumps,” it reminds Ai, through its inert, 
object-like state, of spaghetti bolognese. Secondly, it is liminal: as a 
“parasite,” it is both object and agent, existing by consuming the host that 
it lives within. Finally, it is active, eating and eventually killing that which 
sustains its life. Ai is similarly transgressive through her communication 
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with the customer: seemingly passive, as she watches him eat; liminal, as 
she gives the uncomfortable customer “the smile of a roundworm,” 
adopting its identity; and finally active, by speaking and repelling that 
which she dislikes. Her speech act enables her to spurn passivity and death 
and signals her exit from the realm of the abject and her re-entry into the 
symbolic order. Through it, in fact, Ai repels the customer in the same way 
as her narrative repelled the members of the Dazai Osamu Prize 
Committee.  
Ai’s attempts to locate and describe episodes of physical intensity 
which elude her memory thus result in the formulation of an abject identity 
(“trickl[ing] out with no control,” as Karaki might have put it); and it is 
clear that such an identity subverts conventional expectations of 
femininity (with “rosy” cheeks and “pretty” skin, as Nakamura might have 
put it). However, as Love Life progresses, repressed memories and 
associations that center around the abject maternal body serve more 
specifically to highlight the manner in which female identities are 
necessarily cast as abject, not only through literary critical discourse but 
through the wider social infrastructure and its attendant institutions. 
Hence, having repelled the male customer, Ai recalls visiting her aunt in a 
maternity hospital, the architecture of which serves to cue another set of 
associations that generate potential meanings clustered around the notion 
of “woman.” Specifically, in her memory’s reconfiguration of the hospital, 
Ai forces a link between the hospital corridor and (Ai’s perception of its 
resemblance to) a brothel. She writes that: “[e]xiting the hospital ward was 
a dark narrow corridor that reminded one of a brothel, and at the end of 
the corridor was a tap.”35 By suggesting a collapse of the distinction 
between “mother” and “whore” through an alignment of the physical 
spaces wherein motherhood and whoredom are performed (the maternity 
ward and the brothel), Ai’s narrative necessarily foregrounds the roles that 
constitute “women” in patriarchal societies. The fact that such roles might 
be social rather than “natural” and therefore learned is compounded by the 
additional similarity Ai’s narrative discerns between the hospital building 
and the institution of the school: “There was a set of steps to the side of 
the tap, and these steps had a wide landing like those in a school building 
(all of which was permeated with the smell of disinfectant.)”36 Moreover, 
the narrative’s associative technique has already led Ai’s memory to jump 
from “school” to “hospital.” (Indeed, one could argue that the fact that her 
memory of school is of the school infirmary, collapses the distinction still 
further). 
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As a social institution, the school deploys (in Kristeva’s phrase) “[t]oo 
much strictness on the part of the Other,” instructing young girls how to 
deport themselves, while punishing, censoring, or rather—as references to 
the tap and the smell of disinfectant infers—cleansing behavior which 
departs from examples of modesty and propriety.37 The brothel, in 
contrast, is where we see (again in Kristeva’s phrase) “[t]he lapse of the 
Other,” where women need not abide by rules to cover up or hide their 
sex, but must instead offer it up for a price.38 Kristeva writes that it is in 
cases where society produces such contradictory messages that “a 
narcissistic crisis” is brought about, wherein the subject becomes unable 
to perceive herself as whole and clean through the mirror which society 
holds up, and that this “provides, along with its truth, a view of the 
abject.”39 This appears to be borne out by Ai’s journey down the hospital 
stairs, during which time, that which she at first could only perceive as 
“unknown substances,” transpire to be none other than women’s sexual 
organs, all that represents life in the womb, including fetuses, and parts of 
babies. These have been extracted, preserved, and positioned on the stairs 
of the hospital, reflecting back to Ai disturbing images of the maternal 
body—the site of her identity’s origin, and its irrevocable termination.  
Ai’s own narrative aim is to retrieve and stabilize her memories; 
framed in Kristevan terms, she is attempting to usurp the primacy of the 
imaginary and symbolic order by retrieving a repressed material reality. 
Ai’s attempt at recovering her memories thus works through the 
assumption that the subject can subvert the primacy of the imaginary and 
symbolic order by entering this material reality, and writing (about) it 
“truthfully.” The “truth” which her narrative thus might be considered as 
serving is therefore the horrific manner in which our physicalized identity 
(and particularly that of women’s) is, in modern society, intellectualized, 
obscured, and alienated.  
 
F-narrative-absence 
This second matrix sits alongside Ai-body-presence, commenting on and 
problematizing it, and is generated by Ai’s narration of her relationship 
with, and search for, her elusive husband F. Through the prism of this 
literary matrix—which I shall term F-narrative-absence—Ai pursues, in 
contrast, the notion that her identity is a fiction reliant upon the absent 
other: F. The novella presents us with a second constellatory network of 
associations, a matrix of signification(s) that further disrupts and 
undermines any putative conception of the written self as a coherent, 
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cohesive, unproblematic whole (of the sort so fundamental to I-novel 
discourse).  
However, if F is “absent,” the fact of his absence is continually 
present. Upon getting up in the morning, the first thing Ai encounters are 
the physical traces he has left behind him that morning: the un-washed up 
crockery from breakfast; an unexpected listening choice left on the record 
player; and the magazine he has left open. Furthermore, Ai’s narrative 
repeatedly returns to him. In several places, it deviates from Ai’s present 
physical situation to ponder the meaning of their relationship and her 
feelings for him. In her memories of past traumatic events (for instance, 
the episode at the maternity hospital) he appears and comes to her aid. F 
also features in all Ai’s correspondence with others: when she visits the 
Shinjuku Jazz Café, Mokuba, she exchanges words with a young man who 
turns out to be one of F’s students; he is mentioned in the letter Ai receives 
from her friend in Kyoto; and again in the conversation that she holds with 
another friend, the painter. At the end of each of these episodes, Ai returns 
to the fact that F has disappeared and describes her heightening anxiety, 
reiterating her hypothesis that he has met with an accident, until it finally 
transpires he has been at his friend’s house all day. Despite his absence, F 
thus pervades every experience, memory, and encounter of Ai’s, and her 
search—both literal and metaphysical—for him, shapes her identity and 
drives the narrative forwards: 
 
My life with F. Sometimes I wonder what F is to me, but in the end I’m 
left not understanding. I can only think as others might say, that F is my 
husband; I love him. Whether this is true or not is not for me to know. 
F and I are married. F and I are husband and wife. F is my husband. F 
leaves for work every morning. I am his wife. I love my husband. I 
exhale these words as if they are sentence examples in a foreign 
languages lesson. I even try saying them in English and French. But at 
any rate, they, at the present moment, seem to me like an unshakeable 
truth. F is a concrete, and moreover, abstract presence. Although this is 
perhaps true of all husbands.40 
 
Throughout this passage, F and Ai are rendered as abstract concepts, like 
mathematical symbols, or, in Ai’s phrase, mere “sentence examples” 
which have no actual referent; and their rendering as such enables Ai to 
make and test various ontological assertions about “self” and “other.” 
Statements such as “F and I are married” and “F and I are husband and 
wife” demonstrate how Ai conceives of herself and F both as entities that 
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join together to create one (married) state while retaining their distinction 
from each other. Although Ai describes their objectification and 
possession each by the other, with phrases such as “F is my husband” / “I 
am his wife,” she nonetheless shows how this does not affect their 
individual agency by stressing their active subjectivity in the following 
sentences: “F leaves for work every morning;” “I love my husband.” These 
extremely simple statements reinforce our understanding of the identity of 
each (F leaves: he is absent/ Ai loves: her name means love) while 
stressing the contingency and primary importance of the other (F) to the 
self (Ai). (This is particularly noticeable in the Japanese, wherein F is 
positioned first in all but one sentence.) In this way, rather than shape her 
identity through the othering of all that which she conceives as “external,” 
Ai seeks to understand her connection to reality through the other.  
Establishing the primacy of F to her identity does not, however, entail 
Ai’s negation of her own existence. Rather, in constructing a selfhood 
which is contingent on the other, Ai is able to make assertions of presence 
which are not founded on the need or desire to possess, reduce, or eradicate 
the other. The contingency of Ai’s existence is further emphasized by the 
manner in which Ai precedes her analysis of her relationship with F with 
several phrases that emphasize the provisional nature of such analysis. She 
writes, “[s]ometimes I wonder,” “I can only think as others might say,” 
and “[w]hether it is true or false is not for me to know.” By using these 
expressions, Ai demonstrates that she is fully aware of the provisionality 
of the truth of her assertions about herself, but also of others’ claims to 
“truth.” Because Ai acknowledges this provisionality of truth, words float 
free from her (and others’) subjective realities, as if they are “sentence 
examples in a foreign languages lesson.” Their detachment from the 
potential meaning which Ai, or anyone could imbue them with, strips them 
of empirical meaning. Hence, they become a “fictional” space.  
This “fictional” space invites a very different reading from those 
invited by I-novel discourse. An I-novel, to even qualify as such, 
necessitates the elimination of potential multiple meanings and 
interpretations of its textual operation in order to reduce it to a single, 
“definitive” origin, the “author.” The passage above, is by contrast, 
constructed in such a manner that it is impossible to reach a single 
definitive reading of it. All that we are left certain about when we read the 
passage above, is that for Ai (who is herself a fictional construct), F is “a 
material and moreover abstract presence” (gutaiteki de, nao chūshōteki na 
sonzai), but we are still left unsure what this means. Is he a “real” person; 
part of Ai’s imagination; an abstract symbol or metaphor for something 
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else; or all of these? Moreover, the very use of an initial appears to ask the 
reader to address the question of what (if anything) F stands for.  
While various theories for these questions above have already been 
posited, all that is certain is that the absence of a referent parallels the 
absence of F from Ai’s life.41 And this absence of a referent creates a 
textual space that allows the reader to contribute actively to the text and 
create multiple interpretations and meanings. In other words, the presence 
(or absence) of “F” democratizes the production of meaning and serves to 
privilege the reader over the (implied) “author.” This textual procedure is 
thus in marked contrast to the successful operation of I-novel discourse, 
which forever places the reader in a position of obeisance to the dominant 
voice and supposed identity of the author. Moreover, it serves to stress the 
fictive nature of the text itself. F comes to symbolize the process of reading 
as an act of interpretation. In other words, as a metafictive device, F 
necessarily problematizes the creation of a coherent unified, first-person 
narrative voice, by constantly reminding us that it is fictional, and the 
mode of reading necessitated by I-novel discourse itself. Thus if F can be 
made to stand for anything, it is perhaps for this interpretive space; or 
“fiction.”42 F, as a metafictive device which alludes to the text’s own 
constructedness, then, might also begin to account for “the fuzziness at 
[the novella’s] core” that Ishikawa found so “troubling.” 
 
Conclusions 
These twin matrices collide at the end of the novella when death, which 
has hitherto manifested itself in both Ai’s abject visions, and her 
hypotheses (or fictions) of what might have happened to F, becomes a 
vivid and real event. After hanging up the phone from her conversation 
with F’s friend’s wife, Ai overhears a couple arguing behind her. The 
young woman is furious with the man for saying that he wished to die 
before he turns thirty and tells him that with his attitude he might as well 
try suicide. When they start crossing an intersection, a car comes round 
the corner without reducing its speed and hits them. Ai instinctively runs 
to the girl thinking that the man at least might have received his wish. A 
crowd of people gathers around them while the man’s hands and legs are 
convulsing. The woman lies still on her front, a pool of blood spreading 
out from underneath her. Ai notices that the woman had been carrying a 
book; she sees that the covers of the book have come apart, and that the 
book is lying open next to a bucket of rubbish. As the ambulance arrives, 
Ai remembers that she had speculated that day that F might die, or be dead. 
She picks up the book and gives it to the policeman at the scene, telling 
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him it belonged to the woman. She lights a cigarette and says: “That young 
woman died. She died with complete ease. Complete ease.”43 With tears 
streaming down her face, Ai runs in the opposite direction of the scene of 
the accident. 
On the one hand, this conclusion could be interpreted as affirming the 
textual primacy of the abject, in our first literary matrix, Ai-body-presence, 
in describing the nature of human existence. The event occurs immediately 
after Ai realizes that all her theories about F have been proven to be 
illusory or false. As she puts it, they had “faded under light” (iroaseta), 
and therefore cease to grip her, or have any power over her conception of 
reality.44 Moreover, she realizes that such hypothetical (fictional) 
discourse in itself, is formulated for the very purpose of “fading under 
light,” for not pertaining to reality.45 In contrast, the car accident 
demonstrates to Ai the same message which the abject seeks to impress 
upon us, namely that the fragile body is not only the root of our existence, 
but also its limits. This truth is conveyed to her here in the present moment, 
in bright and vivid detail, right down to the young man’s convulsions and 
the young woman’s pool of blood. The incident highlights that death is 
mundane, complete, and indiscriminate; levelling us all; reducing us to the 
same. 
However, this conclusion could equally be interpreted as affirming the 
primacy, in accounting for human experience, of our second matrix: F-
narrative-absence. Ai exclaims: “That young woman died. She died with 
complete ease. Complete ease.” (Ano shōjo wa shinda. Shōjo wa mattaku 
muzōsa ni shinde itta, mattaku.) The brevity of the first statement 
underscores Ai’s shock at the completeness of death, at its permanent 
termination of the woman’s life. Her repetition of the word “complete” 
indicates that both the “ease” with which death completes, and that it is 
complete, are traumatic to Ai. The woman’s life is unable to repeat, yet Ai 
repeats the fact that it has been completed. It is here that the symbolic 
achieves its ultimate purpose in surpassing death by continuing, even after 
the body has failed, to attempt to understand, describe and explain human 
existence. This is also demonstrated by Ai’s act of saving the woman’s 
book from being discarded as rubbish. Text not only surpasses the body; 
it gives it scope for plurality of identity and difference of meaning through 
an endless chain of “substitution.” Crucially, what goes unmentioned is 
that Ai is clutching her own (unfinished) chronicle of her life, which is to 
become the novella that the reader is reading. As we, as readers, do not 
know what book the young woman was holding, Love Life might become 
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for us its substitute and her epitaph, and offers us again the tantalizing 
prospect of an infinite process of generating literary meaning. 
Love Life, then, offers the reader two modes of being that it does not 
presume to resolve, which in numerous ways lay challenge to the 
fundamental tenets of I-novel discourse. These two matrices foreground 
specific preoccupations and compete with each other for narrative space 
throughout the novella, so that Ai’s experience appears as one which is 
divided by concerns with her own corporeality and for her husband’s 
absence. However, this is not to assert that either matrix is ever defined 
wholly in opposition to the other, nor that any narrative preoccupation 
within these matrices is inscribed as a discrete conceptual entity. Rather, 
each of these matrices and their concomitant preoccupations float in 
perpetual, liminal relation to the other, neither wholly dependent on the 
other for its conceptual definition (that difference-with-no-positive-terms 
that is so fundamental to Saussurean linguistics), nor fully distinct from 
them. As such they function to destabilize any unity of voice of the writing 
“I,” so longed for by the worthies of the Dazai Osamu prize panel, 
facilitating the inscription of an identity which repeatedly lays claim to 
being immediately and physically present, while nevertheless remaining 
contingent on perpetual absence, or fiction. In so doing, they expose and 
encapsulate the paradox implicit in the I-novel’s pretense that the narrator 
signals the author’s presence, even as it necessarily disavows the 
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